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The Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana famously said, “Those who forget 
the past are condemned to repeat it.” While I’ve heard this quote throughout my life, I 
especially recall seeing it revisited several years ago, when a study revealed that 
approximately two-thirds of millennials did not know what “Auschwitz” was. The finding 
prompted much discussion at the time, and renewed calls of “never forget” and “never 
again” among many who took notice. 
Indeed, if headlines are any indication, there does seem to be a mounting fear in our 
society that we are well on our way toward repeating the era of Hitler and Stalin. This 
fear surfaces especially in criticisms of the current presidential administration and its 
supporters, and of the populist and nationalist movements that recent years have seen 
gaining traction in North America and Europe. What accounts for their growth and 
influence? Why the recent backlash against the increasingly global and pluralistic 
mindset that has characterized western politics for the past half-century? 
In his recent book, Return of the Strong Gods: Nationalism, Populism, and the Future of 
the West, R.R. Reno argues that such movements are not the harbinger of a return to 
fascism, as their critics fear. Rather, western elites are now tasting the bitter fruit of 
their own policies and agendas. In effect, Reno argues, we are living amid the ruins of a 
culture led by people whose “never again” mindset has morphed into a socio-political 
wrecking ball that frantically demolishes any effort to construct a positive basis for civic 
life. The present upheavals represent a desperate cry of “Enough!” 
Reno devotes most of the book to developing an account of what he calls the “postwar 
consensus,” which arose out of the west’s revulsion at the horrors of the first half of the 
twentieth century. In the wake of two massive global conflicts driven by nationalist 
ideology, the cultural elites and leadership class of the west sought to define principles 
of social order that would make the world secure from any resurgence of totalitarianism 
and world-consuming violence. In their eyes, this demanded that we cleanse political 
and public life of strong loyalties to those traditional sources of solidarity that have 
united societies in the past, such as nation, class, traditional morality, or religion. These 
Reno refers to as the “strong gods,” realities that transcend the human individual, lay 
claim to his assent and allegiance, and (according to these figures) thereby lay the 
foundation on which totalitarianism is built. 
In their stead, elites asserted that the autonomy of the individual is to be prized above 
all else. Rather than looking to the strong gods to provide social cohesion, maximizing 
the liberties of self-interested individuals would ensure the diffusion of power necessary 
to organize society while also preventing the return of dictators and death camps. 
Meanwhile, the influence of the strong gods must be fiercely opposed wherever it 
begins to re-assert itself. Empirically verifiable “facts,” rather than value-laden and non-
empirical “truths,” should determine the shape of the social contract, and attempts to 
ground public discourse or policy in the latter rather than the former should be 
censured. In this way, the postwar consensus is anti-metaphysical and procedural in its 
approach to social order: just as prioritizing the nation or the state over the 
autonomous individual funds totalitarianism, so does positing any “truth” that purports 
to stand over and above the self and demand its assent. In the place of solidarity around 
strong transcendent claims, we need an “open” society in which minimal restraint is 
placed on the individual’s pursuit of his or her own aims, and in which attempts to 
impose external limitations on this effort are deconstructed and unmasked as the naked 
aggression of an “authoritarian personality.” 
According to Reno, “[t]his basic pattern of analysis—the source of totalitarianism is 
found in the impulse to reach for something greater, and the remedy lies in ‘going small’ 
and adopting a weakening discourse—has been recapitulated countless times in the 
postwar era” (89). It is advanced in the philosophy of Albert Camus and Jacques Derrida, 
in Joseph Fletcher’s “situation ethics,” in the work of postwar theologians such as 
Harvey Cox and Karl Rahner. At the popular level, and more recently, it appears in the 
celebration of anything transgressive or ambiguous, the dissolution of all “binaries” as 
oppressive, and the policing of “microaggressions.” The present regime of political 
correctness is the definitive widespread expression of this cultural-political project. And 
yet, with no small irony, its role in this project displays markedly totalitarian tendencies: 
the “openness” that it advocates it is “a managed, orchestrated, and 
finally compelled openness” (91, emph. mine). 
According to Reno, this consensus is well-established, at least in practice, among liberals 
and conservatives alike. Whether through interventionist economics and the 
ministrations of “social technologists” (e.g. Karl Popper, Arthur Schlesinger) or through 
the autonomous self-regulation of the free market itself (e.g. Friedrich Hayek, Milton 
Friedman), western elites promote a metaphysically void, non-transcendent means of 
sustaining the west’s liberal democratic project. Even the would-be detractors from this 
consensus (here Reno devotes particular attention to William F. Buckley) have in effect 
made peace with it, in that they pragmatically uphold and defend the system’s requisite 
pluralism in the name of winning and keeping “a place at the table” for themselves. 
The effect of the postwar cultural project, in the end, has been to deprive western 
society of any positive basis for the social contract. The only acceptable solidarity is to 
be found in sharing the project of dissolving objective bonds of solidarity. In the 
cheerfully self-contradictory words of the 1968 Paris student revolt, “It is forbidden to 
forbid!” But humans cannot live forever on a specious solidarity of this sort: “A society 
lives on answers, not merely questions; convictions, not simply opinions” (95). Human 
nature itself abhors this vacuum and craves an authority beyond itself to provide it with 
meaning and guidance. 
We are by nature “eccentric” beings, oriented ultimately toward that which is beyond 
ourselves, and attempting to deny or eradicate this eccentricity represents the most 
profound defection from nature imaginable. It leaves us “homeless” in a world with no 
meaning for us beyond the caprice of our own desires. Throughout history, human 
societies have made a home for themselves within a shared sense of collective identity 
and solidarity rooted in transcendent realities whose influence is preserved by tradition. 
But now we have responded to this history’s excesses by celebrating its opposite and 
refusing “to settle into stable convictions or common loves.” Accordingly, Reno 
concludes, the present crisis amounts to “a disquietude born of homelessness” (103). 
This, Reno argues, is what lies at the roots of the populism and nationalism now gaining 
traction throughout the western world. These movements do not amount to a 
resurgence of the kind of totalitarian spirit that western elites fear. Rather, they reflect a 
desperation to fill the very vacuum that the western world’s leaders themselves have 
created and actively defend. It is society’s response to an unfulfilled hunger for a 
solidarity rooted in something more ultimate than the individual self. The metaphysical 
vacuum that the “open society” deliberately creates is ultimately responsible for 
phenomena such as Donald Trump’s election, Brexit, and so forth. “For,” Reno says, 
“deprived of true and ennobling loves, of which the patriotic ardor is surely one, people 
will turn to demagogues and charlatans who offer them false and debasing loves” (162). 
Engaging with these movements fruitfully therefore cannot be a matter of re-asserting 
and defending the tenets of the postwar consensus. Rather, “[t]he essential task of 
political leadership is to help men shelter together within traditions and communities of 
shared loves” (106). Thus Reno concludes the book: 
Our task, therefore, is to restore public life in the West by developing a language of love 
and a vision of the “we” that befits our dignity and appeals to our reason as well as to 
our hearts. We must attend to the strong gods who come from above and animate the 
best of our traditions. Only that kind of leadership will forestall the return of the dark 
gods who rise up from below. (162) 
On the whole, I find Reno’s analysis of the present situation and its historical origins to 
be compelling, if perhaps a bit monolithic. I particularly appreciate the Augustinian 
anthropology that grounds much of his discussion, and value his insistence that a 
coherent social contract depends upon widely shared objects of love that transcend the 
individual. My questions and concerns, meanwhile, have to do with where Reno’s 
description of the “strong gods” fits within a larger theological account of how the cities 
of God and man, with their respective objects of love, relate to each other. 
These concerns undoubtedly owe to the parameters and limitations of Reno’s 
argument, which is not primarily theological in nature, nor are his proposals directed 
toward the church in particular. The questions are surely relevant for that argument, 
however: to what extent do the church’s shared loves overlap with those of western 
society as Reno would have it exist? Where are they in tension? What, moreover, are 
the ramifications of readmitting the “strong gods” of nation and tradition when most of 
the western world today is thoroughly secularized? (To what extent would Reno’s 
proposal amount to a “de-secularization”?) So long as the “strong gods” do in fact 
remain “gods,” to what degree should Christians view their return as a positive 
development? 
It is clear enough in the book (and given his Catholic background, unsurprising) that 
Reno would be happy to see the church regain its former cultural and political 
prominence in the western world. And yet, it is not clear that he thinks this would be 
necessary for the realization of his proposal, nor that the church’s proclamation of the 
gospel would be needed to prevent the return of the strong gods’ darker cousins (e.g. 
militaristic nationalism, totalitarianism). For Reno, the church features as but one of 
several sources of solidarity within the west’s larger cultural-political project, alongside 
other religious organizations or “communities of transcendence” (159). But to what 
extent will the strong gods’ return truly serve the welfare of the modern west—or, at 
least, the welfare of the church in the modern west—without their overt and ultimate 
allegiance to the one whom strong gods slew, and under whose feet they’ve now been 
placed? 
The likes of Karl Popper and John Rawls were not wrong in their judgment that 
transcendent realities can exercise a destructively self-totalizing influence in the world. 
This does not owe to their transcendence as such, but to the ultimacy that we give to 
such realities—an ultimacy that belongs properly to the triune God and to no other. 
Idolatry, in other words, is the origin of totalitarianism, and the twentieth century 
reveals nothing if not the destructive potential of human ideals that have become 
ultimate reality. What, in Reno’s account, is supposed to stand between such recovered 
ideals and their idolatrous ultimacy in a largely post-Christian society? Given that human 
nature is unchanged and that its bearers are eminently forgetful creatures, I find Reno’s 
repeated assurances that the danger is past to be less than convincing. Nevertheless, I 
am grateful for the insights he offers into the nature of the problem. 
 
